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IMPLIED PRIVATE ACTIONS UNDER FEDERAL
STATUTES-THE EMERGENCE OF A CONSERVATIVE
DOCTRINE
Actions based on statutes now comprise the bulk of any federal
court's case load.' As a result of increasing federal regulation plain-
tiffs now can file suit under a multiplicity of federal statutes. These
statutes typically provide an express remedy for the party and con-
fer jurisdiction on the court to hear the complaint. In certain areas,
however, Congress has prohibited specific action or imposed specific
duties, without delineating the rights of private parties or providing
for an express private civil remedy. When this type of statute is
violated the courts must decide if the injured plaintiff has a cause
of action: it must determine whether to imply a private right of
action from the statute.
Private rights of action have been implied under many federal
statutes,2 and the basic premise of implication is accepted, in
theory, by almost all courts.' Courts have failed to agree, however,
1. Justice Frankfurter described the trend as follows:
Inevitably the work of the Supreme Court reflects the great shift in the center
of gravity of law-making. . . . But even as late as 1875 more than 40% of the
controversies before the Court were common-law litigation, fifty years later only
5%, while today cases not resting on statutes are reduced almost to zero.
Some Reflections on the Reading of Statutes, 47 COLUM. L. Rav. 527 (1947). See also Peck,
Our Changing Law, 43 COnNEu L.Q. 27, 31 (1957).
2. See, e.g. Allen v. State Bd. of Elections, 393 U.S. 544 (1969) (Voting Rights Act of 1965);
Wyandotte Transp. Co. v. United States, 389 U.S. 191 (1967) (Rivers and Harbors Act of
1899); J.I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426 (1964) (Securities Exchange Act of 1934); Tunstall
v. Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen, 323 U.S. 210 (1944) (Railway Labor Act); Euresti v.
Stenner, 458 F.2d 1115 (10th Cir. 1972) (Public Health Service Act); Reitmeister v. Reitmeis-
ter, 162 F.2d 619 (2d Cir. 1947) (Communications Act of 1934); Common Cause v. Democratic
Nat'l Comm., 333 F. Supp. 803 (D.D.C. 1971) (Corrupt Practices Act); Fagot v. Flintkote Co.,
305 F. Supp. 407 (E.D. La. 1969) (Fair Labor Standards Act); Kardon v. National Gypsum
Co., 69 F. Supp. 512 (E.D. Pa. 1946) (Securities Exchange Act of 1934); Baird v. Franklin,
141 F.2d 238 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 323 U.S. 737 (1944); Geismar v. Bond & Goodwin, 40 F.
Supp. 876 (S.D.N.Y. 1941).
For many years the courts relied on the tort analogy. In Deckert v. Independence Shares
Corp., 311 U.S. 282, 287 (1940), the Court held that the Securities Act of 1933 did not restrict
the purchaser to a money judgment. In reaching this conclusion, however, the Court did not
consider how such an implied remedy would effectuate legislative intent. See also Tunstall
v. Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen, 323 U.S. 210, 213 (1944); United States v. Perma
Paving Co., 332 F.2d 754, 758 (2d Cir. 1964); Odell v. Humble Oil & Refining Co., 201 F.2d
123, 127 (10th Cir. 1953); Reitmeister v. Reitmeister, 162 F.2d 691, 694 (2d Cir. 1947); Remar
v. Clayton Sec. Corp., 81 F. Supp. 1014, 1017 (D. Mass. 1949).
3. See Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678, 684 (1946) discussed in text accompanying notes 10 &
11 infra. But see United States v. Madison County Bd. of Educ., 326 F.2d 237, 242 (5th Cir.
1964).
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on the requisite circumstances for implying a right of action. Three
recent Supreme Court cases have attempted to resolve this discord
and to establish a workable test for implied rights of action.4 This
Note will review the history of the doctrine of implication and
analyze the effect of these cases and the wisdom of this new trend
they attempt to establish.
HISTORICAL SURVEY OF THE DOCTRINE OF IMPLICATION
The Supreme Court announced the doctrine of implied private
rights of action in Texas & Pacific Railway Co. v. Rigsby. In holding
that an injured employee had a private right of action for damages
under the Federal Safety Appliance Act,' the Court defined the
doctrine in broad terms: "A disregard of the command of the statute
is a wrongful act, and where it results in damage to one of the class
for whose especial benefit the statute was enacted, the right to re-
cover the damages from the party in default is implied . . ."
Although this statement of traditional tort theory8 was sufficient for
Rigsby, as federal statutes and regulations increased significantly in
number and in complexity after 1930,1 it proved an inadequate stan-
dard by which to decide questions of implied rights of action.
In a 1946 decision, Bell v. Hood,0 the Supreme Court, in allowing
recovery of damages for a violation of constitutional rights, stated
a liberal rule for vindicating federal rights: "[W]here federally pro-
tected rights have been invaded, it has been the rule from the begin-
4. Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66 (1975); Securities Investor Protection Corp. v. Barbour, 421 U.S.
412 (1975); National R.R. Passenger Corp. v. National Ass'n of R.R. Passengers, 414 U.S. 453
(1974) (Amtrak).
5. 241 U.S. 33 (1916). Some have traced the doctrine to the early English case, Couch v.
Steel, 118 Eng. Rep. 1193 (Q.B. 1854). See Loss, The SEC Proxy Rules in the Courts, 73 HARV.
L. REv. 1041, 1045 (1960). See also, Thayer, Public Wrong and Private Action, 27 HARv. L.
REV. 317 (1914).
6. Ch. 196, 27 Stat. 531 (1893), as amended, 45 U.S.C. §§ 1-16 (1970).
7. 241 U.S. at 39.
8. See RESTATE ENT OF TORTS § 286 (1934); see also, W. PROSSER, ToRTS § 36 (4th ed. 1971).
9. The federal securities law was one of the first areas in which the courts found implied
private remedies. See, e.g., Goldstein v. Groesbeck, 142 F.2d 422 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 323
U.S. 737 (1944); Baird v. Franklin, 141 F.2d 238 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 323 U.S. 737 (1944).
In Switchmen's Union v. National Mediation Bd., 320 U.S. 297 (1943), the Court recog-
nized that if an act created a right there must be some method of enforcing it, id. at 300, but
nonetheless held that as Congress had the prerogative of deciding how rights created by
statute should be enforced, the specification of one remedy normally would be understood to
exclude another. Id. at 301. This holding is the first example of the Court's applying the rule
of construction-expressio unius est exclusio alterius- to deny implication. Important later
applications of this rule are discussed in notes 150-59 infra & accompanying text.
10. 327 U.S. 678 (1946).
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ning that courts will be alert to adjust their remedies so as to grant
the necessary relief."" Although this statement provided substan-
tial support for plaintiffs who claimed implied rights of action, it
failed to provide useful criteria for determining whether a private
right of action was implied in particular statutes.
The law, therefore, remained unsettled in this area. A series of
decisions in the 1950's, in which the Supreme Court refused to imply
a private right of action, evidenced dissatisfaction and disagreement
over implication." Proffering different grounds for denial in each
case," the Court did not attempt to formulate a test to establish
when such rights should be implied. The strong dissents in these
cases highlight the lack of consensus as to the proper criteria for
deciding the question of implication." Because none of these cases
articulated a test for determining when to allow a private right of
action, 5 the lower federal courts remained in conflict."6
11. Id. at 684.
12. T.I.M.E., Inc. v. United States, 359 U.S. 464 (1959); Nashville Milk Co. v. Carnation
Co., 355 U.S. 373 (1958); Montana-Dakota Util. Co. v. Northwestern Pub. Serv. Co., 341 U.S.
246 (1951).
13. In Montana-Dakota Utilities, the Court held the question of reasonable rates did not
create a private cause of action. They recognized the danger of involvement in administrative
rate-making determinations, holding that as the FPC set the rate the Court could not alter
it. The Court in Nashville Milk held that sections 4 and 16 of the Clayton Act did not permit
a private right of action under the Robinson-Patman Act for sales at an unreasonably low
price. The Court read the legislative history as supporting their proposition that sales at
unreasonably low prices were subject to only the criminal penalities of section 3 of the Act.
The Court again refused to become involved in a rate case in T.I.M.E., holding that the
legislative prescription of reasonable rates created criterion for administrative application
rather than a "justiciable legal right." The Court further supported its holding by reasoning
that as private remedies were expressly provided in other parts of the Act, yet none was
provided in the section pertaining to motor carriers, Congress must have intended to foreclose
such private actions.
14. Each case was decided by a 5-4 margin. In his dissent in Nashville Milk Justice Douglas
urged the Court to imply a private action because he read the legislative history as permitting
such. 355 U.S. at 383. In T.LM.E., Justice Black espoused permitting a right of action
because he felt the Act did not negate common law remedies. 359 U.S. at 480. For a discussion
of this separate problem of the survival of common law remedies, see O'Neil, Public Regula-
tion and Private Rights of Action, 52 CAL. L. REv. 231 (1964).
In perhaps the most perspicacious discussion of implication in these three cases, Justice
Frankfurter, dissenting in Montana-Dakota Utilities, specified certain factors to examine
in determining whether to imply a private right of action. He felt a private action should be
"appropriate to effectuate the purposes of a statute." 341 U.S. at 261. If this were satisfied,
then a court should deny implication only if such actions would interfere unduly with admin-
istrative agencies or impose responsibilities on the courts that they were not equipped to
handle. Id. at 263.
15. In one later case, Hewitt-Robins, Inc. v. Eastern Freight-Ways, Inc., 371 U.S. 84 (1962),
the Court did indicate some factors, other than the tort theory, it might deem significant in
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Then in 1964, the Court adopted a liberal position in J.I. Case Co.
v. Borak, 7 holding that a private party could bring a derivative
action" for the use of false and misleading proxy statements, in
violation of section 14(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.11
In so holding, the Court emphasized the broad remedial purposes
of the Act, deeming private enforcement a "necessary supplement"
to effectuate the congressional purpose."0
Three years later, in Wyandotte Transportation Co. v. United
States,21 the Court reemphasized its Borak position and clarified the
pivotal factors in determining whether to imply a private right of
action: (1) whether the interests of the plaintiff were within the class
protected by the statute; (2) whether the harm that had occurred
was of the type the statute was intended to prevent; and (3) whether
criminal liability was adequate to ensure the effective enforcement
of the statute.12 Although only the last of these factors differs from
implying a private right of action, that is, consistency with effective administration of the
Act and with legislative intent. "Survival depends on the effect of the exercise of the remedy
upon the statutory scheme of regulation." Id. at 89. The Court recognized that there was a
common law right for a carrier to ship by the cheapest route available and held that survival
of a damage claim for misrouting was consistent with the Act. These factors did not evolve
as a test for implying a private right of action because they were not stated clearly in the
opinion. Moreover, one year later the Court denied implication of a right of action without
applying or distinguishing these factors. Wheeldin v. Wheeler, 373 U.S. 647 (1963).
16. Compare Brown v. Bullock, 194 F. Supp. 207, 224 (S.D.N.Y.), af'd, 294 F.2d 415 (2d
Cir. 1961) ("Implied rights of action are not contingent upon statutory language which affirm-
atively indicates that they are intended. On the contrary, they are implied unless the legisla-
tion evidences a contrary intention."), with Consolidated Freightways, Inc. v. United Truck
Lines, Inc., 216 F.2d 543, 545 (9th Cir. 1954) (applying the expressio unius est exclusio alterius
rule to deny implication). Courts continued to imply private rights of action in federal regula-
tory statutes. See, e.g., Dann v. Studebaker-Packard Corp., 288 F.2d 201 (6th Cir. 1961)
(allowing private action under section 14(a) of Securities Exchange Act of 1934, but denying
right for derivative action); Hooper v. Mountain States Sec. Corp., 282 F.2d 195 (5th Cir.
1960) (allowing private action under SEC Rule 10b-5 and section 10(b) of Securities Exchange
Act of 1934); Fitzgerald v. Pan American World Airways, 229 F.2d 499 (2d Cir. 1956) (Civil
Aeronautics Act of 1938); Reader v. Hirsch & Co., 197 F. Supp. 111 (S.D.N.Y. 1961) (margin
requirements of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934).
Other courts denied such private actions. See, e.g., Wheeldin v. Wheeler, 373 U.S. 647
(1963); United States v. Madison County Bd. of Educ., 326 F.2d 237 (5th Cir. 1964); Beury
v. Beury, 127 F. Supp. 786 (S.D.W.Va. 1954).
17. 377 U.S. 426 (1964).
18. Id. at 430-32. In so holding the Court overruled Dann v. Studebaker-Packard Corp.,
288 F.2d 201 (6th Cir. 1961), which had allowed a private action but denied that it could be
derivative.
19. The actions of the defendant also were in violation of SEC Rule 14a-9.
20. 377 U.S. at 432-33.
21. 389 U.S. 191 (1967).
22. Id. at 202. In so deciding the Court also found that the existence of a private right of
action was not contrary to the intent of the Act. Id. at 200. If this characteristic had been
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the long recognized tort theory of the Restatement,23 the clarity of
the Court's pronouncement rendered the Borak- Wyandotte test in-
fluential."'
Despite its wide acceptance application of the test entailed
problems. Because of its expansiveness, courts were able to mani-
pulate the factors to justify their decisions. The three enunciated
factors, standing alone, are too susceptible of diverse interpreta-
tions and applications to be effective.2s Many courts criticized the
expansiveness of the Borak-Wyandotte test;"6 some sought to cir-
cumvent it." The test, as applied by the courts, was inadequate in
added to the three factors, the Borak- Wyandotte test would have been more functional. See
notes 166.68 infra & accompanying text.
23. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) oF ToRTs § 286(a), (c) (1965).
24. See, e.g., Allen v. State Bd. of Elections, 393 U.S. 544, 556-57 (1969) (Voting Rights
Act of 1965); Euresti v. Stenner, 458 F.2d 1115, 1117-18 (10th Cir. 1972) (Hill-Burton Act);
Burke v. Compania Mexicana De Aviacion, 433 F.2d 1031, 1033-34 (9th Cir. 1970) (National
Railway Labor Act); Gomez v. Florida State Empl. Serv., 417 F.2d 569, 576 (5th Cir. 1969)
(Wagner-Peyser Act); New York City Coalition for Community Health v. Lindsay, 362 F.
Supp. 434, 439 (S.D.N.Y. 1973) (Public Health Service Act); Young v. Harder, 361 F. Supp.
64, 71 (D. Kan. 1973) (Uniform Relocation Act); National Ass'n for Community Dev. v.
Hodgson, 356 F. Supp. 1399, 1403 (D.D.C. 1973) (18 U.S.C. § 1913 (1970)); Common Cause
v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 333 F. Supp. 803, 813 (D.D.C. 1971) (18 U.S.C. §§ 608-09
(1970)); Fagot v. Flintkote Co., 305 F. Supp. 407, 410-14 (E.D. La. 1969) (Fair Labor Stan-
dards Act). See Comment, Private Rights of Action Under Amtrak and Ash: Some Implica.
tions for Implication, 123 U. PA. L. REv. 1392, 1396 (1975).
-25. Compare Gomez v. Florida State Empl. Serv., 417 F.2d 569, 576 (5th Cir. 1969)
(Wagner-Peyser Act intended to benefit migrant farm. workers), with 27 Puerto Rican Mi-
grant Farm Workers v. Shade Tobacco, 352 F. Supp. 986, 993 (D. Conn. 1973) (purpose of
same Act to encourage cooperation between states and federal government, thus, no private
right of action for migrant farm workers).
26. One of the earliest criticisms of the test was made by two new Justices of the Supreme
Court in their first consideration of an implied private right of action. See Bivens v. Six
Unknown Named Agents, 403 U.S. 388, 411, 430 (1971) (Burger, C.J., & Blackmun, J.,
dissenting). See also Holloway v. Bristol-Myers Corp., 485 F.2d 986, 998 (D.C. Cir. 1973);
Chavez v. Freshpict Foods, Inc., 456 F.2d 890, 893-95 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1042
(1972); Colligan v. Activities Club of N.Y. Ltd., 442 F.2d 686, 693 (2d Cir. 1971); Pearlstein
v. Scudder & German, 429 F.2d 1136, 1145 (2d Cir. 1970) (dissenting opinion), cert. denied,
401 U.S. 1013 (1971).
27. Perhaps the leading case to distinguish the Barak- Wyandotte rationale is Breitwieser
v. KMS Indus., Inc., 467 F.2d 1391 (5th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 410 U.S. 969 (1973), in which
the court stated that private rights of action would be implied only when the law creating
the right provided for no remedy or for a "grossly inadequate" remedy. Id. at 1392-93. By
thus limiting the scope of the Borak-Wyandotte "inadequacy" test, the court justified its
denial, id. at 1393-94. See also Western v. Hodgson, 359 F. Supp. 194, 200 (S.D.W. Va. 1973).
Lower courts also frequently used statutory construction or the rule of expressio unius est
exclusio alterius to deny implication. See, e.g., Holloway v. Bristol-Myers Corp., 485 F.2d 986,
988-89, 1002 (D.C. Cir. 1973); Chavez v. Freshpict Food, Inc., 456 F.2d 890, 893-95 (10th Cir.),
cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1042 (1972); Colligan v. Activities Club of N.Y., Ltd., 442 F.2d 686 (2d
Cir. 1971); Jordan v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 442 F.2d 78, 81 (8th Cir. 1971); Reid v. Mann,
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that it failed to consider an important variable in statutory interpre-
tation: legislative intent.2" The omission created inconsistencies
because it remained unclear whether to imply a right when con-
fronted with (1) frustration of legislative intent;2" (2) the existence
381 F. Supp. 525, 526-27 (N.D. Ill. 1974); Western v. Hodgson, 359 F. Supp. 194, 200-01 (S.D.
W. Va. 1973); Simpson v. Sperry Rand Corp., 350 F. Supp. 1057, 1059 (W.D. La. 1972); Bass
Angler Sportsman Soc'y v. United States Steel Corp., 324 F. Supp. 412, 415 (N.D. Ala. 1971).
For a further discussion of the use of the maxim expressio unius see notes 150-59 infra &
accompanying text.
Other courts used the existence of alternative federal or state remedies to limit strictly the
inadequacy factor and thereby deny implication. See, e.g., Breitwieser v. KMS Industries,
Inc., 467 F.2d 1391, 1394 (5th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 410 U.S. 969 (1973); Chavez v. Freshpict
Food, Inc., 456 F.2d 890, 895 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1042 (1972); Rogers v. Ray
Gardner Flying Serv., Inc., 435 F.2d 1389, 1393 (5th Cir. 1970); Reid v. Mann, 381 F. Supp.
525, 528 (N.D. Ill. 1974); Western v. Hodgson, 359 F. Supp. 194, 201 (S.D.W. Va. 1973); 27
Puerto Rican Migrant Farm Workers v. Shade Tobacco, 352 F. Supp. 986, 991-92 (D. Conn.
1973); Simpson v. Sperry Rand Corp., 350 F. Supp. 1057, 1060 (W.D. La. 1972).
Still other courts evaded the Borak- Wyandotte test by strictly limiting the class of intended
beneficiaries. See, e.g., Vanderboom v. Sexton, 422 F.2d 1233, 1243 (8th Cir. 1970); Greater
Iowa Corp. v. McLendon, 378 F.2d 783, 790 (8th Cir. 1967); 27 Puerto Rican Migrant Farm
Workers v. Shade Tobacco, 352 F. Supp. 986, 993 (D. Conn. 1973).
28. Although this factor was not expressly included in the Borak-Wyandotte test the Court
has asserted that in each case implication would be consistent with the statutory purpose.
See Allen v. State Bd. of Elections, 393 U.S. 544, 557 (1969) (consistent with broad purpose
to allow private citizens to enforce); Wyandotte Transp. Co. v. United States, 389 U.S. 191,
200 (1967) (no contrary legislative intent found); J.I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426, 431-32
(1964) (broad remedial purposes emphasized). The importance of legislative intent as a factor
was foreshadowed also in two earlier Supreme Court cases: Hewitt-Robins Inc. v. Eastern
Freight-Ways, Inc., 371 U.S. 84, 89 (1962); Montana-Dakota Util. Co. v. Northwestern Pub.
Serv. Co., 341 U.S. 246, 261 (1951) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
The more recent lower federal court cases implying private rights of action all have stressed
that private action should be consistent with the purposes of the statute. See, e.g., Stewart
v. Travelers Corp., 503 F.2d 108, 110-14 (9th Cir. 1974); Farmland Indus., Inc. v. Kansas-
Nebraska Natural Gas Co., 349 F. Supp. 670, 680 (D. Neb. 1972), affd, 486 F.2d 315 (8th
Cir. 1973); Fagot v. Flintkote, 305 F. Supp. 407, 413-14 (E.D. La. 1969).
Courts also have used legislative intent to justify implication. See, e.g., New York City
Coalition for Community Health v. Lindsay, 362 F. Supp. 434, 439 (S.D.N.Y. 1973); Young
v. Harder, 361 F. Supp. 64, 71 (D. Kan. 1973); National Ass'n for Community De. v.
Hodgson, 356 F. Supp. 1399, 1403-04 (D.D.C. 1973); Common Cause v. Democratic Nat'l
Comm., 333 F. Supp. 803, 813 (D.D.C. 1971); Arnesen v. Raymond Lee Org., Inc., 333 F.
Supp. 116, 118 (C.D. Cal. 1971).
Similarly, several cases denying an implied right of action have stressed the importance of
legislative intent. See Holloway v. Bristol-Myers Corp., 485 F.2d 986, 1002 (D.C. Cir. 1973);
Acevedo v. Nassau County, 500 F.2d 1078, 1083-84 (2d Cir. 1974); Jordan v. Montgomery
Ward & Co., 442 F.2d 78, 81 (8th Cir. 1971); Colligan v. Activities Club of N.Y., Ltd., 442
F.2d 686, 692 (2d Cir. 1971); Reid v. Mann, 381 F. Supp. 525, 528 (N.D. Ill. 1974); Western
v. Hodgson, 359 F. Supp. 194, 200 (S.D.W. Va. 1973); Simpson v. Sperry Rand Corp., 350 F.
Supp. 1057, 1059 (W.D. La. 1972); Bass Angler Sportsman Soc'y v. United States Steel Corp.,
324 F. Supp. 412, 415 (N.D. Ala. 1971).
For further discussion of this problem, see notes 160-69 infra & accompanying text.
29. This problem is raised inferentially in Holloway v. Bristol-Myers Corp., 485 F.2d 986,
1976] IMPLIED PRIVATE ACTIONS
of potentially conflicting legislative goals;" or (3) legislative silence
as to private action.3 Thus, a redefinition of standards for determin-
ing whether to imply a private right of action was required.
THE IMPLICATION DOCTRINE IN RECENT SUPREME COURT CASES
Amtrak3 2
In Amtrak the plaintiff Association, which represented railroad
passengers, challenged the discontinuance by the Central of Georgia
Railway Company of several passenger trains, urging that this re-
duction of passenger service violated the Rail Passenger Service Act
of 1970 (Amtrak Act)." The District Court had dismissed the ac-
tion34 upon finding that the plaintiffs lacked standing under section
307 of the Act, which provides for enforcement suits by the Attorney
General or, in cases involving a labor agreement, by employees or
their representatives. 35 The Court of Appeals for the District of Co-
lumbia Circuit reversed in an opinion that addressed both the issue
997-98 (D.C. Cir. 1973) and Pearlstein v. Scudder & German, 429 F.2d 1136, 1147 (2d Cir.
1970) (Friendly, J., dissenting), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 1013 (1971).
30. Compare Gomez v. Florida State Empl. Serv., 417 F.2d 569, 576 (5th Cir. 1969), with
27 Puerto Rican Migrant Farm Workers v. Shade Tobacco, 352 F. Supp. 986, 992 (D. Conn.
1973).
31. For an example of the confusion this creates, compare Burke v. Compania Mexicans
De Aviacion, 433 F.2d 1031, 1033 (9th Cir. 1970), with Chavez v. Freshpict Food, Inc., 456
F.2d 890, 894 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1042 (1972).
32. National R.R. Passenger Corp. v. National Ass'n of R.R. Passengers, 414 U.S. 453
(1974) (Amtrak).
33. 84 Stat. 1327, 45 U.S.C. § 501 et. seq. (1970). The Act prohibited discontinuance of
passenger trains prior to January 1, 1975, unless the railroad had entered into a contract with
Amtrak under which Amtrak would take over the railroad's entire responsibility for intercity
rail passenger service. Because Central of Georgia, but not its parent corporation, Southern
Railway Co., had entered into such a contract, the plaintiffs claimed that no proper contract
existed to permit Central's reduction in passenger train service. 414 U.S. at 454-55, 455 n.3.
34. The decision of the district court was not reported.
35. 45 U.S.C. § 547(a):
If the Corporation or any railroad engages in or adheres to any action, practice,
or policy inconsistent with the policies and purposes of this chapter, obstructs
or interferes with any activities authorized by this chapter, refuses, fails, or
neglects to discharge its duties and responsibilities under this chapter, or threat-
ens any such violation, obstruction, interference, refusal, failure, or neglect, the
district court of the United States for any district in which the Corporation or
other person resides or may be found shall have jurisdiction, except as otherwise
prohibited by law, upon petition of the Attorney General of the United States
or, in a case involving a labor agreement, upon petition of any employee affected
thereby, including duly authorized employee representatives, to grant such eq-
uitable relief as may be necessary or appropriate to prevent or terminate any
violation, conduct or threat.
WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW
of standing and the question of an implied right of action. 6 Because
the issue of standing in this case is not entirely distinct from that
of an implied right of action,37 the appellate discussion of both issues
is of interest.
In considering standing, the court appropriately invoked the three
part test of Association of Data Processing Service Organizations,
Inc. v. Camp (Data Processing).38 The plaintiffs clearly met the first
requirement, having suffered injury in fact by being deprived of
desired passenger train service. 9 Reasoning that railroad passengers
were the intended beneficiaries of the Amtrak Act, the court also
concluded that the plaintiffs met the second part of the test because
they were within the "zone of interests" to be protected by the
relevant statute.40 Whether Congress had intended to bar judicial
review, the third step in the Data Processing test, was a more diffi-
cult question than the first two. By using the "strong judicial pre-
sumption in favor of judicial review,' '4 however, the court was able
to resolve this question in favor of the Association.
In determining that judicial review was not barred, the court
analyzed the Act itself, its legislative history, and its purpose. The
defendant's contention that, under the maxim expressio unius est
exclusio alterius, the express grant of a remedy to the Attorney
General and to employees, precluded a remedy to others was re-
jected. The court deemed the maxim "only an aid to statutory con-
struction, not a rigid rule of law." 42 Similarly, that a congressional
36. National Ass'n of R.R. Passengers v. Central of Georgia Ry., 475 F.2d 325 (D.C. Cir.
1973), rev'd sub noma. National R.R. Passenger Corp. v. National Ass'n of R.R. Passengers,
414 U.S. 453 (1974) (Amtrak).
37. See notes 106-11 infra & accompanying text.
38. 397 U.S. 150 (1970). The three part test requires: (1) that the plaintiff allege he suffered
injury in fact, economic or otherwise, id. at 152; (2) that the plaintiff is within the zone of
interests protected by the relevant statute, id. at 154-55; and (3) that judicial review has not
been precluded by the legislature, id. at 156.
39. 475 F.2d at 330. A number of the organization's members were from Georgia and would
suffer from this discontinuance of intercity rail passenger service.
40. Id. at 330-31. The court found support for this conclusion in its reading of the congres-
sional findings and declaration of purpose of section 101 of the Amtrak Act, 45 U.S.C. § 501
(1970). In its reversal, the Supreme Court later would disagree with the court of appeals on
this issue. See 414 U.S. 453, 461 (1974); see also notes 53-58 and 160-69 infra & accompanying
text.
41. 475 F.2d at 331, citing Barlow v. Collins, 397 U.S. 159, 166 (1970).
42. 475 F.2d at 331. The court cited several Supreme Court and lower federal court deci-
sions that argued for limited use of the maxim. Id. at 331.32. Furthermore, the court read
the statutory provision as an authorization for the Attorney General to bring suit: "By sin-
gling out the Attorney General, Congress did not attempt to provide the sole means for
litigating violations of the Act, but merely emphasized, even to the point of redundancy, that
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subcommittee considered, but did not adopt, a proposed amend-
ment to the Act expressly providing for redress at the urging of any
aggrieved party, was given little weight because the court was un-
willing to draw inferences from the unexplained failure of the legis-
lature to adopt a proposed amendment. 3 As to the purposes of the
Act, although the court recognized that one of the objectives was
to facilitate elimination of uneconomical passenger trains, it em-
phasized the primary goal of saving passenger trains from extinc-
tion, concluding that enforcement by parties other than the Attor-
ney General was not only consistent with, but also required to effect
this objective."
Significantly, in deciding whether Congress intended to preclude
suits by parties not expressly given standing in the Amtrak Act, the
court did not start from a neutral position, "but rather from a strong
presumption in favor of judicial review.""5 Similarly, in dictum spe-
cifically addressing the question of the plaintiff's implied right of
action, the court of appeals accepted the premise that a finding of
an implied right of action was reasonable, "absent express and defi-
nite indications to the contrary . ... "I From this premise, the
conclusion that the plaintiffs had a proper right of action followed
almost immediately, for the lack of express and contrary congres-
sional intent had been determined during the prior inquiry into
standing.
The Supreme Court's decision, reversing and remanding Amtrak
to the District of Columbia Circuit, did not begin analyzing the
dispute from a position so favorable to the plaintiff's cause. Writing
for the majority, Justice Stewart identified the threshold issue as
the Attorney General had broad powers to seek equitable relief under the Act." Id. at 332.
The court also noted that the inclusion of employee representatives' right to sue expressly
was merely emphasis that "labor's authority to sue is much broader." Id. at 333.
43. Id. at 335, quoting the rationale for this conclusion in United States v. Wise, 370 U.S.
405, 411 (1962): "Logically, several equally tenable inferences could be drawn from the failure
of the Congress to adopt an amendment ... including the inference that the existing legisla-
tion already incorporated the offered change."
44. 475 F.2d at 337.
45. Id. at 331.
46. Id. at 340. At the time, many courts accepted this basic premise. See, e.g., Burke v.
Compania Mexicans De Aviacion, 433 F.2d 1031, 1033 (9th Cir. 1970); National Ass'n For
Community Dev. v. Hodgson, 356 F. Supp. 1399, 1403-04 (D.D.C. 1973); Fagot v. Flintkote
Co., 305 F. Supp. 407, 412 (E.D. La. 1969). But see Chavez v. Freshpict Foods, Inc., 456 F.2d
890, 894 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1042 (1972).
The court also noted increasing acceptance of the "private Attorneys General" theory in
support of private enforcement actions. 475 F.2d at 340.
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the existence of a cause of action, 7 thus avoiding the liberal stand-
ing tests of Data Processing."' Furthermore, in accepting the plain-
tiffs argument that a right of action by private parties should be
implied under the criteria of Borak,49 the Court imposed an addi-
tional criterion: that the inference of a private cause of action "must
be consistent with the evident legislative intent and, of course, with
the effectuation of the purposes intended to be served by the Act.""0
Finally, the decision stressed the principle that if legislation ex-
pressly provides a particular remedy or remedies, courts should not
extend the coverage of the statute "to subsume other remedies."',
In noting that this reflection of the ancient expressio unius maxim
"must yield to clear contrary evidence of legislative intent," 52 the
Court, in effect, established the rule that a right of action should
not be inferred unless clear evidence of supporting legislative intent
could be found. Beginning with this negative presumption, the
Court examined the same legislative history that the court of ap-
peals had considered53 and concluded Congress had intended that
private rights of enforcement not be created by the Amtrak Act.5
In corroboration of this stance, the Court deemed private rights of
action inimical to the purposes of the statute. Contrary to the con-
clusions of the court of appeals and of Justice Douglas in his dis-
sent,55 the majority concluded that the Act's principal objective was
a workable system of passenger rail service, which could be achieved
only by the elimination of uneconomical routes." Opening the dis-
trict courts to private parties who could challenge every discontinu-
ance therefore would lead to protracted litigation, thus destroying
47. 414 U.S. at 456.
48. See notes 38-41 supra & accompanying text.
49. J.I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426 (1964). The Borak test for implied rights of action
is discussed in notes 17-24 supra & accompanying text.
50. 414 U.S. at 458. See notes 14 & 15 supra.
51. Id.
52. Id., citing Neuberger v. Commissioner, 311 U.S. 83, 88 (1940).
53. 414 U.S. at 458-60. See note 43 supra & accompanying text.
54. The Court considered that an amendment before the House Committee would have
authorized suit by any "person adversely affected or aggrieved," but that the Secretary of
Transportation opposed allowing such private actions and the Committee then turned down
this amendment. The Court read this as deliberate preclusion of private enforcement. 414
U.S. at 460-61.
55. Both concluded that the Act's primary purpose was to protect rail passengers. See
National Ass'n of R.R. Passengers v. Central of Georgia Ry., 475 F.2d 325, 331 (D.C. Cir.
1973), rev 'd sub nom. National R.R. Passenger Corp. v. National Ass'n of R.R. Passengers,
414 U.S. 453 (1974) (Amtrak); 414 U.S. at 471 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
56. 414 U.S. at 461, quoting H.R. REP. No. 91-1580, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1970).
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the efficient administrative system the Act attempted to establish.,
The majority also concluded that because the Amtrak system was
subject to the scrutiny of the Attorney General and Congress, pri-
vate actions would be unnecessary."
Justice Douglas' dissent in Amtrak59 underscores the majority's
shift from the traditional view that "judicial review 'is the rule, and
nonreviewability an exception which must be demonstrated,'" to a
presumption of nonreviewability.1° By rejecting the distinction be-
tween the issues of right of action and right of standing, 1 Justice
Douglas argued strongly for application of the Data Processing
test.2 Moreover, in convincing arguments that the Attorney General
has but limited authority to bring actions under the express statu-
tory mandate and could not possibly prosecute every violation of the
Act, the dissent stressed the need for private actions to enforce the
Act. 3
This pointed restatement of the "private Attorneys General" ra-
tionale highlights the principal weakness in the reasoning of the
majority opinion-the conclusory statement that policing by the
Attorney General is sufficient. 4 Despite substantial precedent as-
serting inadequacy of enforcement as a primary factor in implica-
tion decisions," the majority opinion largely ignored this considera-
tion. Furthermore, although the majority departed from the Borak-
Wyandotte rationale, 6 it failed to indicate what weight it should be
given in the future. On the other hand, the dissent failed to consider
realistically the impact unfettered private actions would have on
the organizational scheme Congress intended to establish under the
Act.
57. 414 U.S. at 462-64.
58. Id. at 464. By implication, this conclusion rejects application of the "private Attorneys
General" rationale. See note 46 supra.
59. 414 U.S. at 466.
60. Id. at 469, quoting Barlow v. Collins, 397 U.S. 159, 166 (1970).
61. d. at 467.
62. Id. at 469. The Data Processing test is discussed in note 38 supra.
63. 414 U.S. at 470.71.
64. Id. at 464.
65. See, e.g., Allen v. State Bd. of Elections, 393 U.S. 544, 557 (1969); Wyandotte Transp.
Co. v. United States, 389 U.S. 191, 202 (1967); J.I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426, 432-33
(1964); Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678, 684 (1946).
66. See text accompanying notes 17-24 supra.
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The Securities Investor Protection Corporation (SIPC) Litigation7
In the Securities Investor Protection Act of 1970 (SIPA),18 Con-
gress created the Securities Investor Protection Corporation (SIPC)
as a non-profit, private membership corporation, vested, under
specified conditions, with the authority to bring liquidation pro-
ceeding against failing brokerage firms, to protect the investor-
customers."9 Congress committed supervision of the SIPC to the
Securities and Exchange Commission, expressly affording the SEC
a right of action to compel the SIPC to discharge its statutory obli-
gations.7 0
Guaranty Bond and Securities Corporation, a registered broker-
dealer, had been placed in receivership by a district court. When the
appointed receiver sued to compel intervention by the SIPC, the
court joined the issue of whether a right of action by a private party
was impliedly created by the SIPA.11 Although it recognized the
receiver's right of action, the district court denied relief, holding
that the Act did not apply to the brokerage firm.72 The Court of
Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, however, determined that the Act did
apply to Guaranty Bond & Securities Corporation.73 Although it
accepted the district court's decision that the receiver had standing,
the court of appeals provided few reasons for doing so. The court
gave little consideration to the Data Processing test, mentioning it
only in a footnote." In the pertinent part of the opinion, however,
the court clearly relied on the presumption in favor of private ac-
tions, the prevailing view in the federal courts.75 Because this pre-
67. SEC v. Guaranty Bond & Sec. Corp., 496 F.2d 145 (6th Cir. 1974), rev'd sub nam.
Securities Investor Protection Corp. v. Barbour, 421 U.S. 412 (1975).
The case was argued in the court of appeals on December 12, 1973, almost a month before
the Supreme Court's decision in Amtrak (January 9, 1974). For this reason and because the
court of appeals saw the primary issue as standing, the court did not deal with Amtrak.
68. 84 Stat. 1636, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78aaa et. seq. (1970).
69. A concise discussion of the background and objectives of the SIPA appears in SIPC,
421 U.S. at 415-17. The SEC and the independent securities industry organizations are
required to notify the SIPC when a registered broker-dealer is in financial difficulty. If the
SIPC then finds that this party is in danger of failing to meet its obligations and is showing
signs of financial irresponsibility, it can move for a liquidation proceeding in a district court.
70. Section 7(b) of the SIPA, 15 U.S.C. § 78ggg(b) (1970), provides that in event the SIPC
fails to use its funds to benefit the customers of a member broker-dealer the SEC can move
in a district court to compel the SIPC to discharge its obligations.
71. 496 F.2d at 146.
72. Id.
73. Id. at 149.
74. Id. at 150 n.6.
75. "We are persuaded, however, that the lack of express language of exclusivity in provid-
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sumption had been rejected firmly by the Supreme Court in
Amtrak, reversal was forseeable.
Justice Marshall's opinion announcing reversal followed the ana-
lytical approach of Amtrak in establishing as prerequisites to impli-
cation: (1) identification of the threshold issue as that of the im-
plied right of action, 6 and (2) existence of extrinsic evidence that
Congress intended to allow private actions." As in Amtrak, the
Court first held private actions to be inconsistent with congressional
intent and objectives, ' and then proceeded to distinguish earlier
decisions upholding implied rights of action." Both Borak,8" which
dealt with violation of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 in the
solicitation of proxies, and Allen,8' which arose under the Voting
Rights Act of 1965, were readily distinguished; in both of those
cases, not only was the need for supplemental private actions appar-
ent to the Court and to the agencies given express enforcement
authority, but also no harm to the intended congressional scheme
was anticipated from the use of private actions. 2
The emphasis in SIPC on effectuation of the legislative objec-
tives, including both the ultimate goals and the regulatory devices
intended to achieve these goals, suggests that, of the traditional
rules of statutory construction, the one actually relied upon by the
Court was not expressio unius, as expressly mentioned in Amtrak,
but the "mischief" rule, that is, "to make such construction as shall
suppress the mischief, and advance the remedy ....
Cort v. Ash"
In Cort, the plaintiff, a stockholder of Bethlehem Steel Corpora-
tion and a registered voter, instituted an action against the corpora-
ing for an enforcement action by the S.E.C., coupled with a general provision allowing for
suits against the S.I.P.C., evidences an intent by Congress that the statute should not be as
narrowly construed as the appellees [S.E.C. & S.I.P.C.] urge." Id. (emphasis supplied;
footnotes omitted). See note 46 supra & accompanying text.
76. 421 U.S. at 415.
77. Id. at 420-21.
78. Id. at 423.
79. Id. at 423-24.
80. J.1. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426 (1964). See notes 17-20supra & accompanying text.
81. Allen v. State Bd. of Elections, 393 U.S. 544 (1969). This case was relied on by Justice
Douglas, in his dissenting opinion in Amtrak, 414 U.S. at 469.
82. 421 U.S. at 423-25. The Court also noted that the Securities Exchange Act of 1934,
relevant to Borak, contained both a general grant of jurisdiction to the district courts and
standards of conduct that could be enforced by private actions. Id. at 424.
83. Heydon's Case, 76 Eng. Rep. 637, 638 (1584).
84. 422 U.S. 66 (1975), reu'g 496 F.2d 416 (3d Cir. 1974).
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tion's directors, on his behalf and derivatively on behalf of the cor-
poration, alleging illegal corporate expenditures prior to the 1972
federal election 5 and seeking injunctive relief and damages." In the
first post-Amtrak case to consider the implication issue, the Court
of Appeals for the Third Circuit, reversing the district court's sum-
mary judgment for the defendants, implied a right of action from a
statutory section providing for criminal sanctions but not for civil
remedies. The court interpreted Amtrak restrictively, concluding
that its rule against judicial expansion of an expressly stated and
particular statutory remedy would apply only to "a remedy that
may logically be said to be exclusive."87 Not finding the criminal
sanctions to be thus "exclusive", 8 the court held for the plaintiff
after analyzing the question in view of both the Borak-Wyandotte
factors"9 and the additional criterion required by Amtrak, consist-
ency between private suits and legislative objectives. 0 Judge Aldi-
85. 18 U.S.C. § 610 (1970), as amended 18 U.S.C. § 610 (Supp. H 1972).
It is unlawful ... for any corporation'whatever ... to make a contribution or
expenditure in connection with any election at which Presidential and Vice
Presidential electors or a Senator or Representative in . . .Congress are to be
voted for ....
The next paragraph of the section prescribes criminal penalties for violation of the section.
86. 422 U.S. at 71. Initially, the plaintiff's complaint also included a claim under Delaware
law, based on the same allegations of corporate misconduct, but this claim later was dropped.
Id. at 72.
87. 496 F.2d at 421.
88. Id. at 421-22. In Amtrak, the statute provided for civil redress by suit by the Attorney
General. See note 35 supra & accompanying text.
The court recognized that if the legislature, either expressly or impliedly, had demonstrated
some intent "to grant or withhold a cause of action" then this intent would govern. 496 F.2d
at 421. But this was as far as the court's reading of Amtrak would go; realizing the Supreme
Court's use of the expressio unius logic was unclear the court would carry it no further. Id. at
421 n.3. It did not believe that the maxim had become the controlling law, reasoning that:
"This rule of statutory construction does not alter the process used to determine if a cause
should be infered in the absence of statutory language indicating legislative intent; rather, it
aids the court merely in determining when legislative intent to preclude a remedy can fairly
be implied." Id. (footnote omitted).
89. See notes 21-24 supra & accompanying text.
90. After examining the construction that had been given to the predecessor of section 610
the court found that Ash, the plaintiff, was within the class the statute was designed to
benefit-as a citizen-voter and as a shareholder-and that corporate campaign contributions
were clearly the evil the statute was designed to prevent. 496 F.2d at 422. In so doing it
rejected the defendants' argument that because section 610 actually was intended to benefit
the public in general no cause of action could be implied. This argument was rejected on the
basis of Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents, 403 U.S. 388 (1971), in which a private cause
of action had been found to be implied by the fourth amendment's protection against unrea-
sonable searches and seizures. Id. at 422-23.
The court examined the "propriety" of inferring a private cause of action from the statute
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sert's dissenting view that Amtrak was a definite signal to the lower
federal courts to "decelerate" reliance on the language of Borak in
finding implied civil remedies,' proved, however, to be the more
accurate appraisal of the judicial trend.
In a carefully drafted opinion, Justice Brennan, speaking for a
unanimous Court, reversed the court of appeals.12 The Court did not
uphold the plaintiffs right to maintain an action as citizen-voter
because intervening law 3 required that remedies for the future vio-
lations of the type in question be pursued through the newly estab-
lished Federal Election Commission. In denying the plaintiff's sec-
ond implied cause of action for damages as a shareholder, however,
the court enumerated the critical factors in the form of a four-part
test:
First . . . does the statute create a federal right in favor of the
plaintiff?. Second, is there any indication of legislative intent,
explicit or implicit, either to create such a remedy or to deny one?
. . . Third, is it consistent with the underlying purposes of the
legislative scheme to imply such a remedy for the plaintiff?...
And finally, is the cause of action one traditionally relegated to
state law, in an area basically the concern of the States, so that
it would be inappropriate to infer a cause of action based solely
on federal law?"
In applying the test, the Court first considered the legislative
history, determining that stockholders were but subsidiary benefici-
aries of the legislation, which "was primarily concerned with corpo-
rations as a source of aggregated wealth and therefore of possible
corrupting influence, and not directly with the internal relations
between the corporations and their stockholders."95 Secondly, al-
though the legislative history contained no suggestion of an intent
either to create or to deny a federal right to damages, the Court
found support there for the conclusion "that the expectation, if any,
was that the relationship between corporations and their stockhold-
and found implication to be proper on two grounds. First, private rights of action would
effectuate the purposes of the statute, because it could be expected shareholders would
oversee corporate expenses carefully. Secondly, the more rapidly moving civil process would
be more effective in preventing violations that would be more likely to occur shortly before
elections. d. at 423-24.
91. 496 F.2d at 426-27.
92. 422 U.S. 66, 68-9 (1975).
93. Federal Election Campaign Act Amendments of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-443, 88 Stat. 126.3
(1974).
94. 422 U.S. at 78 (citations omitted).
95. Id. at 82.
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ers would continue to be entrusted entirely to state law." 8 Thirdly,
the plaintiff's claim was rejected because allowing a stockholder to
maintain such a derivative action would not further the purposes of
the Act. A private right of action could not prevent the harm of
corporate campaign contributions because recovery of damages, the
only remedy available to the plaintiff, could be awarded only after
the money had been used for the forbidden purpose. Fourthly, the
commitment of funds by investors with the understanding that ex-
cept for a few, express responsibilities imposed by federal law, state
law would govern internal corporate matters, was deemed a bar to
a federal cause of action. The argument is that investors who are
on notice that state law controls may not have recourse under any
federal statute. Borak, which did involve state law to some extent
was distinguished by the congressional intent to supersede, as much
as was constitutionally permissible, state corporate law of proxy
regulation."
In response to the defendant's argument that a statute creating
only a penal remedy cannot be construed to create a right of action
for any particular class, the Court cited Wyandotte, 00 Borak, 10, and
Rigsby'0 2 as supporting the proposition that a criminal penalty
"does not necessarily preclude a private cause of action for dam-
ages."'' 3 The Court distinguished these three cases, however, on the
ground that each involved a "statutory basis for inferring that a civil
cause of action of some sort lay in favor of someone."'' The Court
nevertheless was unwilling to go further and state that a bare crimi-
nal statute never could support an implied cause of action. 0 5
96. Id. at 83-84.
97. Id. at 84.
98. Id. at 84-85.
99. Id.
100. Wyandotte Transp. Co. v. United States, 389 U.S. 191 (1967). See notes 21-24 supra
& accompanying text.
101. J.1. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426 (1964). See notes 17-20 supra & accompanying
text.
102. Texas & Pacific Ry. v. Rigsby, 241 U.S. 33 (1916). See notes 5-7 supra & accompany-
ing text.
103. 422 U.S. at 79.
104. Id. (footnote omitted).
105. Id. at 80.
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THE "NEW LAW" OF IMPLICATION
When To Make the Implication Decision
In Amtrak, Justice Stewart's majority opinion specified that, if
claimed under the implication doctrine, the right to bring the action
must be determined before the question of the plaintiffs standing
or that of jurisdiction is addressed, "for it is only if such a right of
action exists that [the court] need consider whether the [plaintiff]
had standing to bring the action and whether the District Court had
,jurisdiction to entertain it."'' The logic of this rule is compelling,
provided that the issues are distinct. In the dissent, however, Jus-
tice Douglas found no substantive difference between the questions
of "right of action" and of "standing" or "jurisdiction" in Amtrak. 107
These divergent conclusions apparently result from differing con-
cepts of standing. The breadth of the standing doctrine, as under-
stood by Justice Douglas, is evidenced by his majority opinion in
Data Processing. '0" Of the three tests for standing described in that
case, the first, whether the plaintiff has suffered injury in fact, goes
to the constitutional requirement of a true controversy. The two
additional questions-whether the plaintiffs were arguably within
the zone of interests protected by the statute, and whether judicial
review is precluded-overlap the issue of the implied right of ac-
tion. "'09
The importance of the ostensibly procedural rule announced in
Amtrak is that the determination of the plaintiffs right to bring the
action will be made separately, according to more restrictive cri-
teria, rather than under a broad view of standing and under the
liberal tests of Data Processing. Thus, in future cases involving an
implied right of action, Data Processing may well not constitute a
significant precedent, for when the right of action has been evalu-
106. 414 U.S. at 456.
Initial determination of the right of action had not been the uniform practice in the lower
federal courts. See, e.g., Peoples v. United States Dep't of Agric., 427 F.2d 561, 564 (D.C.
Cir. 1970); Norwalk CORE v. Norwalk Redev. Agency, 395 F.2d 920, 927 (2d Cir. 1968);
Common Cause v. Democratic Nat'] Comm., 333 F. Supp. 803, 808 (D.D.C. 1971); Organized
Migrants in Community Action, Inc. v. James Archer Smith Hosp., 325 F. Supp. 268, 270
(S.D. Fla. 1971).
107. "Whatever the merits of the distinction between these three concepts may be in some
situations, the difference here is only a matter of semantics." 414 U.S. at 467.
108. See note 38 supra.
109. See notes 38-41 supra & accompanying text.
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ated according to the criteria of Cort v. Ash, "I the critical questions
of Data Processing, other than that of a true controversy, will have
been answered."'
The Court's New Attitude: Restricting Access to the Federal Courts
Undeniably, the Court has become more restrictive in allowing
implied rights of action; but beyond this more conservative outlook
is a new attitude of greater scope. Not only has the Court begun to
limit a potential plaintiff's entry into the system of federal courts
through a refusal to imply private rights of action, but it also has
limited access to the courts through use of the doctrines of stand-
ing"' and justiciability."3 This reflects the view that the Court of the
1970's favors a more restricted role for the federal judiciary in the
constitutional scheme of separation of powers."'
This new conception is evinced in the Supreme Court's latest use
of the standing doctrine to deny judicial remedies to parties seeking
vindication of their rights through the courts.15 To so use standing
is an abrupt departure from prior practice, as it was only with Flast
v. Cohen"' in 1968 that the Court adopted a liberal view of stand-
ing."' Moreover, even more recently, the Court announced the lib-
110. 422 U.S. 66 (1975).
111. Restriction of the standing doctrine to the question of the plaintiff's actual injury was
urged by Justice Brennan in his dissent in the companion case decided with Data Processing.
Barlow v. Collins, 397 U.S. 159, 168 (1970).
112. See Schlesinger v. Reservists Comm., 418 U.S. 208 (1974); United States v. Richard-
son, 418 U.S. 166 (1974).
113. Laird v. Tatum, 408 U.S. 1 (1972).
114. This new attitude was demonstrated by the then new members of the Court in Bivens
v. Six Unknown Named Agents, 403 U.S. 388, 411 (1971) (Burger, C.J., dissenting); id. at
430 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
115. See note 119 infra. & accompanying text.
116. 392 U.S. 83 (1968).
117. For a time after Flast v. Cohen the Court reduced its use of the standing doctrine to
prevent plaintiffs from seeking to adjudicate in the federal courts. In Flast the Court distin-
guished an earlier holding that had denied taxpayer standing to challenge government ex-
penditures, Frothingham v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447 (1923), suggesting that Frothingham 's bar
to taxpayer suits was merely a policy limitation and not a constitutional prohibition, 392 U.S.
at 93-94. Chief Justice Warren reasoned that standing had a constitutional basis grounded
in the "case or controversy" requirement of Article Il, which focuses on deciding if the
plaintiff is a proper party to bring the action, rather than on the substantive issues. Id. at
94-101. Proceeding from this argument he then espoused a two part "nexus" test that was
applied to allow taxpayer standing. Id. at 102-05. Thus the move toward "open courts" had
begun. For an example of this "open court" viewpoint, see id. at 111-12 (Douglas, J., concur-
ring).
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eral standing test of Data Processing. "8 Yet in 1974 the Court, by
rejecting the plaintiffs' standing in two cases decided the same day,
demonstrated a new conservative outlook regarding standing."9
Although these recent decisions did apply the tests of the earlier
liberal cases and possibly could be reconciled with them, the lan-
guage of the majority opinions evidences a more restrictive ap-
proach to standing. Chief Justice Burger's majority opinion in
United States v. Richardson'0 illustrates this conservatism:
It cah be argued that if respondent is not permitted to litigate
this issue, no one can do so. In a very real sense, the absence of
any particular individual or class to litigate these claims gives
support to the argument that the subject matter is committed to
the surveillance of Congress, and ultimately to the political
process.'
Throughout these cases Chief Justice Burger and Justice Powell
stressed that the judiciary's role is limited and that too great an
assumption of jurisdiction is both unconstitutional and incompati-
118. Association of Data Processing Serv. Orgs., Inc. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150 (1970). In this
case, the Court allowed the plaintiff organization to challenge certain regulations established
by the Comptroller of the Currency because the members of the organization had suffered
injury in fact, were protected under the statute, and judicial review was not precluded. Id.
at 152-56. In so holding the Court declined to follow the more restrictive legal interest test.
Justice Douglas, writing for the majority, aptly described the trend with his observation that,
'Iwhere statutes are concerned, the trend is toward enlargement of the class of people who
may protest . . . ." Id. at 154. See also Barlow v. Collins, 397 U.S. 159 (1970). The only
dissenter in these two cases was Justice Brennan who favored a more liberal test.
119. Schlesinger v. Reservists Comm., 418 U.S. 208 (1974); United States v. Richardson,
418 U.S. 166 (1974). In Richardson the Court resurrected the Frothingham rationale and
concluded that because plaintiff was pursuing only a "generalized grievance" the requisite
standing was not present. 418 U.S. at 176-77. Using the test of Flast v. Cohen the Court
further reasoned that the plaintiff's standing as a taxpayer was inadequate because there was
no logical nexus between the status asserted and the claimed failure to require reporting of
CIA expenditures. The plaintiff failed to establish this nexus for two reasons. First, his
challenge was not to a statute under the taxing and spending power but rather to a regulatory
statute. Second, there was no allegation that the funds were being spent in violation of any
specific constitutional limitation on the taxing and spending power. 392 U.S. at 175.
Schlesinger involved a challenge to the Armed Forces Reserve membership of certain mem-
bers of Congress as being in contravention of the Incompatibility Clause, U.S. CONST. art. I,
§ 6, cl. 2. Here the Court rejected the district court's contention that the law of standing no
longer had any vitality and overturned the partial grant of summary judgment by the court
of appeals. Because the plaintiff's injury was only "abstract" and generalized, the Court held
it was insufficient to support a finding that the plaintiffs had citizen standing. 418 U.S. at
217-22, Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490 (1975), continued the trend toward a more conservative
standing doctrine.
120. 418 U.S. 166 (1974).
121. Id. at 179.
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ble with the democratic system of government. 2
Analogous to these recent limitations on the standing doctrine are
the Court's restrictions of the scope of the implied private right of
action under section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 of the Securities Ex-
change Act of 1934.123 In Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores 24
the Court upheld the Birnbaum rule'2 and limited the class of plain-
tiffs in these actions to actual purchasers or sellers. The Court's
decision was based, at least in part, on pragmatic "policy considera-
tions" 2 reminiscent of the concerns voiced by the majority in
United States v. Richardson and Schlesinger v. Reservists
Committee.27 Then in Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder28 the Court,
though again recognizing the validity of the implied private right of
action under Rule lOb-5,11 held that negligent conduct alone was
insufficient to maintain an action. 3 The Court thus significantly
narrowed the scope of this right of action. Although the holding was
based on a reading of the legislative intent 3' it was evident that
"policy considerations" again controlled the outcome. 3 2
Throughout these recent cases dealing with standing, the scope
of the 10b-5 cause of action, and implied private rights of action
generally, the Court repeatedly has stressed factors that reflect a
conservative approach to the function of the federal courts, the pro-
per role of the federal courts in relation to the state courts, the
proper role of the courts in relation to Congress, and the limitations
of the federal courts in light of the potential burdens on the judicial
system. Apparently a majority of the Court believes that the doc-
trine of standing and, probably, the closely related doctrine of im-
122. See Schlesinger v. Reservists Comm., 418 U.S. 208, 222 (1974); United States v.
Richardson, 418 U.S. 166, 180 (1974) (Powell, J., concurring).
123. See generally Kardon v. National Gypsum Co., 69 F. Supp. 512 (E.D. Pa. 1946); Note,
Implied Liability Under the Securities Exchange Act, 61 HAxv. L. REv. 858 (1948).
124. 421 U.S. 723 (1975).
125. Birnbaum v. Newport Steel Corp., 193 F.2d 461 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 343 U.S. 956
(1952). See also 9 LoYoA L.A. L. Rav. 666 (1976).
126. 421 U.S. at 737-48. The Court focused on the availability of a remedy under state law,
the danger of vexatious suits, problems of proof of damages, and the potential for abuse of
the federal courts.
127. See note 119 supra & accompanying text. See also note 114 supra.
128. 96 S. Ct. 1375 (1976).
129. Id. at 1382 & nn. 14 & 15.
130. Id. at 1383-91.
131. The Court noted that Congress did not adopt a uniform negligence standard through-
out the Act, id. at 1384, and that the express civil liabilities created by the Act each contains
its own standard of fault necessary for recovery, id. at 1388.
132. See, e.g., id. at 1391 n.33.
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plication must be applied with restraints or the judicial process will
be abused. Perhaps the most striking contrast between this more
limited view and that held previously can be seen by comparing
Justice Black's often quoted rule that "where federally protected
rights have been invaded, it has been the rule from the beginning
that courts will be alert to adjust their remedies so as to grant the
necessary relief", 1 with Chief Justice Burger's recent, less generous
statement that "[olur system of government leaves many crucial
decisions to the political processes. The assumption that if respon-
dents have no standing to sue, no one would have standing, is not a
reason to find standing."134
The Governing Standards of Implication
That the factors enunciated in Cort are to control is evident;
determining what these standards imply, however, is problematic.
Clearly, the first factor, that the plaintiff.be an intended beneficiary
of the statute, is of long standing; in every case considering
implication the Court has required that the plaintiff be such an
intended beneficiary. ' But the Court's treatment of this factor in
Cort indicates that a plaintiff will have difficulty proving that the
statute created a federal right in his favor. 36 Under this new rule a
party seeking to pursue an implied right of action must demonstrate
either that the statute was intended to benefit him or to invest some
right in him or that the statute established a regulatory scheme
governing the rights and duties of the parties before the court.' 37
The second factor, relating to legislative intent, appeared in
Amtrak and in SIPC as a requirement that an affirmative intention
to create a cause of action exist.' In Cort this rather extreme ap-
proach was rejected although "an explicit purpose to deny such
cause of action would be controlling."'39 The Court limited the
expressio unius rule to the facts of Amtrak, noting that in the cases
cited by petitioners' the legislative history contained specific evi-
133. Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678, 684 (1946) (emphasis supplied).
134. Schlesinger v. Reservists Comm., 418 U.S. 208, 227 (1974).
135. See, e.g., Texas & Pacific Ry. v. Rigsby, 241 U.S. 33, 39 (1916).
136. The opinion suggests that a "clearly articulated federal right in the plaintiff. . . or a
pervasive legislative scheme governing the relationship between the plaintiff class and the
defendant class in a particular regard..." must be shown. 422 U.S. at 82.
137. Id.
138. SIPC, 421 U.S. at 421; Amtrak, 414 U.S. at 457.
139. 422 U.S. at 82.
140 Amtrak, 414 U.S. 453 (1974) and T.I.M.E., Inc. v. United States, 359 U.S. 464 (1959).
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dence supporting an inference that the express remedies were exclu-
sive. The Court reasoned that no such exclusionary intent could be
inferred in Cort, because the statutory provision in issue had been
in existence years before Congress provided civil remedies for other
sections of the Act.'4'
That the implication of a private right of action be consistent with
the Act's purpose is the third element of the Cort test. The Court's
use of this factor demonstrates that a private cause of action can be
implied only if it would in no way produce consequences that might
undermine the underlying statutory scheme."' In Cort, the absence
of even implicit legislative intent was interpreted as supporting the
status quo in which state law controlled corporate-shareholder rela-
tions nearly exclusively.' Such a conclusion from a blank record
supports denial of an implied right of action based on statutory
provisions of long standing; for the absence of private actions is the
status quo.
The final element in the Cort test is whether the "cause of action
is one traditionally relegated to state law . . . so that it would be
inappropriate to infer a cause of action based solely on federal
law."144 In limiting the intrusion of federal law into areas that should
be controlled by state law the Court again appears to be motivated
by a strong belief that the federal courts are courts of "limited
jurisdiction". 45
Critical Analysis of the Cort Factors
The long-standing requirement that the statute in question bene-
fit the plaintiff seeking an implied cause of action by creating some
right in him'46 is a proper consideration in the implication question.
For the courts to grant parties not within the scope of a statute's
protection a right to sue thereunder truly would be judicial legisla-
tion; such implied rights would circumvent the legislative intent,
and could produce results directly contrary to the statute's pur-
poses.'47 Courts often have recognized this limit to the doctrine of
implication; as the Court noted in Cort, in cases in which implica-
141. 422 U.S. at 82 n.14.
142. See SIPC, 421 U.S. at 419.
143. 422 U.S. at 83.84.
144. Id. at 78.
145. See notes 111-15 supra & accompanying text.
146. See note 135 supra & accompanying text.
147. If in Amtrak the true beneficiaries of the Act clearly had been the railroads, it would
have been improper for a federal court to have considered implication.
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tion has been allowed there has been some evident statutory basis.4 ,
Although a plaintiff must be able to bring his proposed cause of
action within the scope of a statute"' before such a right of action
will be implied, this factor alone will not justify implication.
Unlike this first element of the Cort test, the required search for
some express or implied indication that Congress intended either to
grant or to deny a private right of action is not sound. Reliance on
this factor in denying implication usually entails one of two ap-
proaches: use of the maxim expressio unius est exclusio alterius or
an attempt to find some evidence that Congress considered private
rights of action.5 0 Both of these approaches are inappropriate in
considering implication.. Doctrinally, implication is based on the
presumption that Congress either did not consider the remedy or
was unable to determine what remedies would be needed because
the legislation encompassed areas not previously considered.'5'
Consequently, examining a statute's history in searching for some
specific indication is unwarranted; implied rights of action are
founded on a presumption of congressional silence.
Before its revival in Amtrak, certain courts, either expressly or
inferentially, had relied on the expressio unius maxim to deny im-
plication of private rights of action."' Use of this rule of statutory
construction, however, is unwise, especially in making such a com-
148. 422 U.S. at 78. See text accompanying notes 100-04 supra.
149. If the cause of action claimed is not within the scope of a statute, then the plaintiff
must bring it within some constitutional provision conferring such a right. See, e.g., Bivens
v. Six Unknown Named Agents, 403 U.S. 388 (1971); Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678 (1946).
150. Both approaches were used in Amtrak. 414 U.S. at 457.
151. "The weaknesses of the court as a lawmaker . . . are less serious when conduct has
already been proscribed by the legislature and only an additional remedy is sought. Making
its decision in relation to an existing and functioning statute, the court may be in an even
better position to assess the need for supplemental civil relief than was the legislature at the
time of enactment." Note, Implying Civil Remedies From Federal Regulatory Statutes, 77
HAav. L. REV. 285, 291 (1963). For another lucid statement of the theory behind implication,
see Sierra Club v. Morton, 400 F. Supp. 610, 622 (N.D. Cal. 1975).
152. For instances in which courts expressly asserted the rule to defeat implication, see
Howard v. Furst, 238 F.2d 790, 793 (2d Cir. 1956); Consolidated Freight-Ways, Inc. v. United
Truck Lines, 216 F.2d 543, 545 (9th Cir. 1954); Western v. Hodgson, 359 F. Supp. 194, 201
(S.D.W. Va. 1973).
Other courts have used the rule to deny implication without mentioning the rule specifi-
cally. See, e.g., T.I.M.E., Inc. v. United States, 359 U.S. 464, 471.72 (1959); Switchmen's
Union v. National Mediation Bd., 320 U.S. 297, 301 (1943); Breitwieser v. KMS Industries,
Inc., 467 F.2d 1391, 1394 (5th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 410 U.S. 969 (1973); Chavez v. Freshpict
Foods, Inc., 456 F.2d 890, 893-94 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1042 (1972); Jordan v.
Montgomery Ward & Co., 442 F.2d 78, 81 (8th Cir. 1971); Simpson v. Sperry Rand Corp.,
350 F. Supp. 1057, 1059 (W.D. La. 1972); Acorn Iron & Supply Co. v. Bethlehem Steel Co.,
96 F. Supp. 481 (E.D. Pa. 1951).
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plex determination as that of implied private rights of action. In
cases in which implication is not an issue, the rule of expressio unius
has been criticized and strictly limited. Given the nature of the
legislative process, often resulting in compromise and ambiguous
language, and given the complexity of statutes and schemes of regu-
lation, such a factor, which focuses only on the express terms of the
statute, is of limited use, especially if the statute has broad remedial
purposes." 3 Expressio unius is a rule reflecting a conservative view
of the scope and of the desirability of statutory law;'5' indeed, the
only purpose ever served by applying the maxim is to restrict statu-
tory provisions. Its use usually justifies a decision actually made
because of a personal policy preference, and precludes consideration
of all relevant factors. Apparently, a majority of courts would refuse
to consider it controlling for the purpose of establishing legislative
intent because the rule often establishes nothing but only raises
further questions.'55
Not only has the rule of expressio unius been rejected generally,
but also, courts repeatedly have refused to apply the maxim in
implication cases.' Whether defined liberally or strictly, implica-
tion requires the court to look beyond the express language of the
statute.5 ' As the expressio unius rationale includes a presumption
153. See, HART & SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC PROBLEMS IN THE MAKING AND APPLCA-
TION OF LAW 1173-74 (temp. ed. 1958).
154. The Supreme Court has recognized that rules of statutory construction such as this
"come down to us from sources that were hostile toward the legislative process itself and
thought it generally wise to restrict the operation of an act to its narrowest permissible
compass. However well these rules may serve at times to aid in deciphering legislative intent,
they long have been subordinated to the doctrine that courts will construe the details of an
act in conformity with its dominating general purpose, will read text in the light of context
and will interpret the text so far as the meaning of the words fairly permits so as to carry out
in particular cases the generally expressed legislative policy." National Ass'n R.R. Passengers
v. Central of Georgia Ry. Co., 475 F.2d 325, 332 (D.C. Cir. 1973), quoting SEC v. Joiner
Leasing Corp., 320 U.S. 344, 350-51 (1943), rev'd sub nom. National R.R. Passenger Corp. v.
National Ass'n R.R. Passengers, 414 U.S. 453 (1974) (Amtrak).
155. See HART & SACKS, supra note 153; Note, Implying Civil Remedies From Federal
Regulatory Statutes, 77 HARv. L. REv. 285, 290-91 (1963).
156. See, e.g., Stewart v. Travelers Corp., 503 F.2d 108, 110-12 (9th Cir. 1974); Fratt v.
Robinson, 203 F.2d 627, 632 (9th Cir. 1953); Fagot v. Flintkote Co., 305 F. Supp. 407, 414
(E.D. La. 1969).
For examples of courts, which though denying implication in the specific case, recognized
the validity of the doctrine, see Holloway v. Bristol-Myers Corp., 485 F.2d 986, 989 (D.C. Cir.
1973); Fischman v. Raytheon Mfg. Co., 188 F.2d 783, 787 (2d Cir. 1951); Remar v. Clayton
Sec. Corp., 81 F. Supp. 1014 (D. Mass. 1949); Kardon v. National Gypsum Co., 69 F. Supp.
512 (E.D. Pa. 1946).
157. See note 151 supra. For an example of a case denying implication although recognizing
the doctrine as valid, see Holloway v. Bristol-Myers Corp., 485 F.2d 986, 989 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
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against any such extension of statutes, it is inherently inimical to
implication. No case adopting this rule as controlling ever has
inferred a private right of action. In Amtrak this restrictive principle
was used to raise an almost irrebutable presumption against impli-
cation.'58 Although such a severe construction was not applied in
Cort, restrictive application of the principle was not expressly re-
jected. Relying on Amtrak, courts, therefore, may deny additional
private enforcement actions in cases in which the statutes involved
provide limited, express civil remedies. 59
Admittedly, legislative intent as derived from the statutory lan-
guage, legislative history, and overall statutory scheme do contrib-
ute to the implication decision. This contribution, however, does not
require any search for specific intent relating to private rights of
action. Although the Court in Cort rejected Amtrak's incorrect ap-
proach,"'i it continued to argue that if the legislative history sug-
gested an intent to deny private actions, this would control the
implication issue.'' The realities of the legislative process and the
limits on the usefulness of legislative history, however, weigh
against any such reliance on mere indications of congressional will.
Even if private rights of action were considered by Congress, in
few cases would there be a clear indication of actual intent. Most
bills receive such detailed consideration only before a committee or
subcommittee; even an unambiguous statement by a witness or a
committee member would be meager evidence on which to allow or
to deny implication, for the stated intent could not be imputed to
the other members of that committee. Amtrak exemplifies the diffi-
culties in interpreting legislative history. Statements made by labor
representatives, a letter from the Secretary of Transportation, and
a subsequent language change all were relied on by the Supreme
Court in searching for legislative intent.8 2 Such factors, however,
are inconclusive. Although the Secretary apparently opposed pri-
158. See notes 51.54 & 77 supra & accompanying text. The degree to which the Court relied
on the expressio unius principle in SIPC is not entirely clear. See note 83 supra & accom-
panying text.
159. See generally Loss, The SEC Proxy Rules In The Courts, 73 H~Av. L. Ray. 1041, 1045-
58 (1960).
In implying rights of action under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 courts evidently
reject the expressio unius approach, for the Act does contain provisions with express civil
remedies (§§ 9(e), 16(b), and 18). See, e.g., Fratt v. Robinson, 203 F.2d 627, 632 (9th Cir.
1953).
160. See notes 51-54 supra & accompanying text.
161. 422 U.S. at 82.
162. 414 U.S. at 460-61.
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vate enforcement, it is as likely that the committee did not adopt
his position, but rather, intended the wording of section 307 to be
merely an authorization for the Attorney General to enforce the
Act. '3 Similarly, in most cases legislative history is equally suscep-
tible to such diverse interpretations.
The Cort test suffers from this reliance on legislative history even
though in precluding implication it would use only evidence of an
intent to deny a private right of action. For, as legislative history
readily can be interpreted divergently, it is apt to be used to justify
a decision actually based on the judge's personal policy views., 4
Conversely, however, any decision as to implication cannot ignore
legislative intent. The proper application of legislative intent is
enunciated in the third requirement in Cort that a private right of
action may be implied only if it is consistent with the purposes of
the statute. Indeed, this requirement is the Court's most significant
addition to the law of implication."'
Because the Borak- Wyandotte test lacked any such factor,' over-
broad implications of rights of action resulted. 6 ' Clearly, considera-
tion of the compatibility of a private action with the underlying
statutory scheme is a necessary limitation. For example, in SIPC
enforcement by the customers of a broker-dealer would have quali-
fied under each step of the Borak rationale; yet, as the Court dem-
onstrated, such private actions would have contravened the purpose
of the SIPA, leaving investors unprotected.' If courts were allowed
to frustrate the legislative will through implication of private rights
of action inconsistent with the statute's purposes, they would be
circumventing the constitutional system of separation of powers by
acting as both the lawmakers and the interpreters of the law.
163. This possible interpretation of the legislative history was suggested by the court of
appeals. 475 F.2d at 332. The Supreme Court dealt neither with this contention nor with the
court of appeals' suggestion that if only the Attorney General could sue, then Amtrak could
not sue for violations of the Act. 475 F.2d at 333.
164. See note 27 supra & cases cited therein.
165. Although this factor was first clearly established in recent cases it had been suggested
by other courts. See, e.g., Wyandotte Transp. Co. v. United States, 389 U.S. 191, 200 (1967);
Hewitt-Robins, Inc. v. Eastern Freight-Ways, Inc., 371 U.S. 84, 89 (1962); Montana-Dakota
Util. Co. v. Northwestern Pub. Serv. Co., 341 U.S. 246, 263 (1951) (Frankfurter, J., dissent-
ing); Stewart v. Travelers Corp., 503 F.2d 108, 112 (9th Cir. 1974); Farmland Indus., Inc. v.
Kansas-Nebraska Natural Gas Co., 349 F. Supp. 670, 679 (D. Neb. 1972), aff'd, 486 F.2d 315
(8th Cir. 1973); Arnesen v. Raymond Lee Org., Inc., 333 F. Supp. 116, 118 (C.D. Cal. 1971).
166. See notes 25-31 supra & accompanying text.
167. For a discussion of this potential danger, see Holloway v. Bristol-Myers Corp., 485
F.2d 986 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
168. 421 U.S. at 423.
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When the statute in question has more than one purpose,' a
private right of action to serve one of these purposes might be incon-
sistent with another of the statute's purposes. Such a situation man-
dates judicial restraint; if this conflict exists a court should refuse
to inject itself into the legislative sphere, and thus should deny
implication. The legislature then would be forced to reconcile the
statutory goals and to provide for the desired and necessary reme-
dies.
The final standard established by Cort, whether the cause of ac-
tion was one usually controlled by state law, also had been sug-
gested by other courts but never so specifically stated. These courts
denied implication because available rights of action under state
law provided the plaintiff an adequate remedy.Y7 0 Reliance on this
factor stemmed from several considerations: pragmatism, federal-
ism, and the existing Borak- Wyandotte test.
As discussed earlier, many courts were dissatisfied with the lib-
eral implication rationale, at least in part because it contributed to
the increased workload and backlog in the federal courts. "' Because
the number of federal statutes and regulations were multiplying
rapidly, an increasing number of parties seeking to have their rights
vindicated under these statutes called for the right of private en-
forcement. Existing remedies under state law, which could be pur-
sued in state courts, provided grounds for declining implication, at
least in cases in which federal law had not completely superseded
that of the state. Although not specifically raised by any court, in
some cases courts did consider federalism . 7 Because federal courts
operate only as courts of limited jurisdiction, they should not readily
invade areas in which state issues and interests predominate. More-
over, state courts provide sufficient means for the vindication of
rights properly governed by state law. Therefore, if the plaintiff had
no express federal remedy it was entirely logical to relegate his claim
to the state courts.
169. This problem was suggested in Amtrak. It appeared equally as plausible that the Act
was designed to provide the railroads with an efficient means of discontinuing uneconomical
routes as that it was designed to protect the passengers.
170. See, e.g., Colligan v. Activities Club of N.Y., 442 F.2d 686, 693 (2d Cir. 1971); Rogers
v. Ray Gardner Flying Serv., Inc., 435 F.2d 1389, 1393 (5th Cir. 1970); 27 Puerto Rican
Migrant Farm Workers v. Shade Tobacco, 352 F. Supp. 986, 991-92 (D. Conn. 1973); Beury
v. Beury, 127 F. Supp. 786, 789.90 (S.D.W. Va. 1954).
171. See note 26 supra & cases cited therein.
172. This is the presumption underlying Rogers v. Ray Gardner Flying Serv., Inc., 435 F.2d
1389, 1393 (5th Cir. 1970).
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Reliance on state remedies to deny implied private rights of ac-
tion under federal statutes also evolved from the "adequacy of exist-
ing remedies" element of the Borak-Wyandotte test.7 3 Although
there the element was described in terms of the adequacy of crimi-
nal liability,'74 many courts, reasoning correctly, discerned that the
important concern was that a private right of action not be implied
if it was unnecessary. "5 Thus, if the plaintiff's injury could be
remedied adequately under state law an implied federal right of
action was inappropriate. Theoretically, implication is based upon
the contention that because proscription of private rights of action
would thwart the statutory goals, the courts must imply such ac-
tions because presumably, the legislature would not have passed an
unworkable law. 7 ' Thus, the existence of sufficient state law protec-
tion destroys the basis for implication.
Although this element reflects legitimate concerns surrounding
the issue of implication, it raises certain problems that courts have
yet to resolve completely. For example, if constitutionally proper
federal legislation preempts existing state law then the federal law
will control and state remedies become irrelevant. But if the federal
law does not completely abrogate state law and dominates in only
certain areas, the question arises as to what effective state remedies
remain. The Court in Cort recognized this problem and suggested
an answer.' Distinguishing Borak, the Court noted that there com-
mitting plaintiff's action to state law might have frustrated the
federal statute's purposes. In Cort, however, because the state rem-
edy only allowed for recovery of damages after the fact, it did not
limit the effect of corporate funds on federal elections. Under Cort,
resolution of the problem must be determined by the nature of the
state cause of action and by the purpose of the federal statute.' 8
Because cases might exist in which it would be unclear whether
state remedies interfere with the federal statute Cort suggests that
even a possibility of interference is sufficient to allow the plaintiff
173. See note 22 supra & accompanying text.
174. As set forth in Wyandotte this requirement read: "that criminal liability was in-
adequate to ensure full effectiveness of the statute which Congress had intended." 389 U.S.
at 202.
175. See note 170 supra & cases cited therein.
176. "Of course the statute must be fairly treated; and if a private action is necessary to
carry it into effect, the legislature must be credited with the intent to provide such a remedy."
Thayer, Public Wrong and Private Action, 27 HARv. L. REv. 317, 331 (1914).
177. 422 U.S. at 84-85.
178. Id.
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an implied federal right of action rather than consigning him to the
state's courts.'
Although considered indirectly via the state law factor the Cort
standards for implication conspicuously lack one factor required for
a proper test: necessity,' 0 an essential element in many implication
decisions since Borak.'"I Necessity or inadequacy of existing enforce-
ment not only has precedential support as an important element in
implication, it also is logically required. Without such a factor im-
plication could at once be too broad or too strict. For although a
plaintiff could fulfill all the other requirements of the Cort test,
implication nonetheless might be improper, for example, if an ad-
ministrative agency is adequately enforcing the statue.' 2
Thus, the Court's failure to include specifically the necessity for-
mulation of Borak-Wyandotte might produce results inconsistent
with the legislative purposes. This omission is remedied partially,
however, by applying the state law and consistency factors. As such,
except for the dubious element requiring a search for specific legisla-
tive intent as to private rights of action, the Cort test is theoretically
sound. It remedies the unlimited Borak-Wyandotte test by includ-
ing the restriction that implication be consistent with the legislative
scheme; it rectifies the too narrow holding of Amtrak and SIPC by
restricting the use of the expressio unius rule.
The Cort Standards in the Lower Federal Courts
The lower court decisions will demonstrate the true impact of the
Cort test. Previous standards of implication have appeared func-
tional when announced by the Supreme Court but have foundered
as unmanageable in the daily activities of the lower federal courts.
Thus any weaknesses inherent in the Court's new test will be re-
flected in its use in the district courts and circuit courts.
Since Cort, a majority of the courts confronting implication have
179. Discussing Barak the Court noted that if the plaintiff could not have a private action
and the state afforded no remedy for misleading proxy use "'the whole purpose of section
14(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 might be frustrated.'" Id. at 85, quoting J.I.
Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426, 433 (1964) (emphasis supplied).
180. See note 176 supra.
181. See, e.g., Stewart v. Travelers Corp., 503 F.2d 108, 113-14 (9th Cir. 1974); Gomez v.
Florida State Empl. Serv., 417 F.2d 569, 576 (5th Cir. 1969); Common Cause v. Democratic
Nat'l Comm., 333 F. Supp. 803, 813 (D.D.C. 1971). This factor was stressed also by Justice
Harlan in Biuens v. Six Unknown Named Agents, 403 U.S. 388, 406 (1971) (Harlan, J.,
concurring).
182. See, e.g., Holloway v. Bristol-Myers Corp., 485 F.2d 986, 989, 997-98 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
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attempted to apply its standards," 3 though some have ignored
them.'" Several courts have noted the restrictive implications of the
Cort standards;'" others have stressed policy considerations similar
to those prevalent in the Supreme Court's opinions. s6 Of the two
potential problems noted above, only one appears serious. No court
has had difficulty with examining the legislative intent. Thii ele-
ment generally has been handled as suggested by the Court of Ap-
peals for the Third Circuit in Ash v. Cort;1s7 that is, it would be
considered relevant or controlling only if a specific indication of
legislative intent to preclude private rights of action was found. 8
The problem that has arisen is the uncertainty generated by the
omission of a necessity factor. Since Cort, implication of private
rights of action has been both denied and allowed based on the lack
of or presence of necessity to grant such a right of action."9 Given
the precedential and theoretical support for this factor,'10 lower
courts apparently will not soon cease to consider this in their impli-
cation decisions. But beyond this, the lack of a clear policy regard-
ing the position of "necessity" in the implication framework has
engendered confusion with respect to one specific situation; when
existing state remedies exist concurrently with a federal scheme of
rights and remedies courts have disagreed as to the propriety of
relegating plaintiffs to their state remedies or of allowing them to
183. See, e.g., Polansky v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 523 F.2d 332 (3d Cir. 1975); McNa-
mara v. Johnston, 522 F.2d 1157 (7th Cir. 1975); De Jesus Chavez v. LTV Aerospace Corp.,
412 F. Supp. 4 (N.D. Tex. 1976); Rauch v. United Instruments, Inc., 405 F. Supp. 442 (E.D.
Pa. 1975); Traylor v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 402 F. Supp. 871 (N.D. Cal. 1975); In re Paris Air
Crash of March 3, 1974, 399 F. Supp. 732 (C.D. Cal. 1975).
184. See Evans v. Kerbs & Co., 411 F. Supp. 616 (S.D.N.Y. 1976); Guernsey v. Rich Plan,
408 F. Supp. 582 (N.D. Ind. 1976).
185. Goldman v. First Fed. Sav. & L. Ass'n, 518 F.2d 1247, 1250 n.6 (7th Cir. 1975).
186. Traylor v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 402 F. Supp. 871, 876 (N.D. Cal. 1975) (stressing large
number of potential claims and subsequent burden on the federal courts).
187. 496 F.2d 416 (1974). See notes 87-89 supra & accompanying text.
.188. See, e.g., Polansky v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 523 F.2d 332, 336 (3d Cir. 1975); De
Jesus Chavez v. LTV Aerospace Corp., 412 F. Supp. 4, 6-7 (N.D. Tex. 1976); Rauch v. United
Instruments, Inc., 405 F. Supp. 435, 439 (E.D. Pa. 1975); Sierra Club v. Morton, 400 F. Supp.
610, 623 (N.D. Cal. 1975).
189. See, e.g., Polansky v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 523 F.2d 332, 337 (3d Cir. 1975)
(denying implication); Rauch v. United Instruments, Inc., 405 F. Supp. 435, 440 (E.D. Pa.
1975) (allowing implication); Traylor v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 402 F. Supp. 871, 876 (N.D.
Cal. 1975); Sierra Club v. Morton, 400 F. Supp. 610, 625 (N.D. Cal. 1975) (allowing implica-
tion); Network Project v. Corporation for Pub. Broadcast., 398 F. Supp. 1332, 1338 (D.D.C.
1975).
190. See notes 180-82 supra & accompanying text.
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bring federal actions.' 1 Because the decision in each case will re-
quire examining the relations between the federal and state law, it
is evident that there is little chance for consensus or for an unam-
biguous test. At best courts will have to consider the effect on the
federal statute of limiting plaintiffs to their state remedies. Given
the Supreme Court's present view, it probably will be necessary that
the federal statute be rendered unenforceable unless private rights
of action are allowed and that the statute clearly preempt the rele-
vant state law.
CONCLUSION
The history of the doctrine of implication in the courts has been
marked by confusion and conflict. A lack of consensus as to what
are proper considerations in making the decision of whether to
imply a private right of action is the basis of this problem. Those
standards that have been suggested in the past have not provided
proper limits; the lower federal courts have not had a single clear
test to follow. In a series of recent cases culminating in Cort, the
Supreme Court has attempted to establish standards to govern cor-
rectly the implication issue and settle some of the existing problems
in this area. Although the new approach is conservative, the Court
has succeeded in fashioning a workable test. With restraint in
applying the legislative history element and with the added crite-
rion of the necessity of private actions, this test should prove to be
a useful and manageable guide for courts when they are faced with
a plaintiff seeking access to the federal courts under an implied
cause of action.
191. Compare Polansky v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 523 F.2d 332, 337 (3d Cir. 1975), with
Rauch v. United Instruments, Inc., 405 F. Supp. 435, 440.42 (E.D. Pa. 1975).
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